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Abstract
This paper pursues a better interpretation of new reproductive technologies by making a counterpoint to 
the scientistic bias of bills being processed in a country that excels in defending the interests of professio-
nals, especially in clinics and laboratories, disregarding the new person generated. The social and scientific 
relevance of the subject is to reflect on the necessity of attention and caution in the implementation of the 
new technologies for breeding. Today, technological advancement is closely tied to the means of acquiring 
power and lacks evaluative constructs. There is a risk of disrespecting constitutional rights. The primary 
objective of this research is to seek a new valuation of human, social and juristic scientific and technologi-
cal innovations in the field of assisted reproduction. To attain this end, we will adopt the content analysis 
methodology, taking as theoretical framework the concept of person developed by Robert Spaemann.
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Resumen
El presente artículo busca una mejor interpretación de las nuevas tecnologías reproductivas contraponien-
do al sesgo cientificista de los proyectos de ley en tramitación en un país que priman por la defensa de los 
intereses de los profesionales, en especial clínicas y laboratorios, desconsiderando los derechos del nuevo ser 
generado. La relevancia social y científica del tema está en reflexionar acerca de la necesidad de atención y 
cautela en el implemento de las nuevas tecnologías destinadas a la reproducción. Hoy, el avance tecnológico 
está íntimamente vinculado a los medios de adquisición de poder y carece de construcciones valorativas. El 
objetivo precoz de este trabajo está en buscar una nueva valoración humana, social y jurídica de las innova-
ciones científicas y tecnológicas en el campo de la reproducción asistida. Para la persecución de este fin, se 
adoptó como metodología el análisis de contenido, tomando por marco teórico el concepto de persona desar-
rollado por Robert Spaemann.
Palabras clave: tecnología, diagnóstico genético pre-implantación, reproducción asistida, persona, Derechos 
Fundamentales.
Resumo
O presente artigo busca uma melhor interpretação das novas tecnologias reprodutivas contrapondo-se ao viés 
cientificista dos projetos de lei em tramitação no país que primam pela defesa dos interesses dos profission-
ais, em especial clínicas e laboratórios, desconsiderando os direitos do novo ser gerado. A relevância social 
e científica do tema está em se refletir acerca da necessidade de atenção e cautela no implemento das novas 
tecnologias destinadas à reprodução. Hoje, o avanço tecnológico está intimamente vinculado aos meios de 
aquisição de poder e carece de construções valorativas. O objetivo precípuo deste trabalho está em buscar uma 
nova valoração humana, social e jurídica das inovações científicas e tecnológicas no campo da reprodução 
assistida. Para persecução deste fim, foi adotada como metodologia a análise de conteúdo, tomando-se por 
marco teórico o conceito de pessoa desenvolvido por Robert Spaemann.
Palavras-chave: tecnologia, diagnóstico genético pré-implantação, reprodução assistida, pessoa, Direitos Fundamentais.
INTRODUCTION
The scientific progress in the biomedical field 
and the control of the legal-social processes that 
accompany such progress do not move at the 
same speed, for there is an enormous discrepancy 
between the speed of the first and the slowness 
of the second. The increasingly urgent need for 
legal responses for the technologically advanced 
society is notorious. The constant alterations in 
the technological plan must be followed by a 
change in the legal-institutional environment.
However, as confirmed by the present research, 
this does not apply to Brazilian Law. Technolo-
gies for assisted reproduction are not ruled in 
an ethical-normative manner, but rather they 
are oriented by scientistic knowledge and eco-
nomic interests. In the face of the new dangers 
to human dignity due to the advance in tech-
nological control over the human species, Law 
is responsible for the arduous task of protecting 
people in all of their dimensions. Ethics by 
itself is not strong enough to guarantee respect 
for a person. Therefore, law is responsible for 
defending the human being against the abuses 
to which it is exposed to during all of the most 
fragile moments of its existence, from beginning 
to end. The law is also entitled to the task of 
formulating a comprehensive strategy for the 
rehabilitation of the subject that is constantly 
threatened by the fragmentation of her identity. 
In this context, we introduce the issue of the 
legal-moral status of the human embryo that 
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originates from in vitro fertilization. It is of the 
utmost importance to face this controversy, since 
the definitions of what is legal and illegal in relation 
to the new possibilities of artificial intervention 
of human life depend on a response for the per-
sonality of these beings created in laboratories.
This article seeks to find the lost connection 
between man and person. For this, we adopt the 
concept of persona by Robert Spaemann (2010) 
in order to show the identity between “human 
being” and “person.” We defend the notion that 
the human embryo is a person and has very 
personal rights (Andorno, 2012; Palazzani, 2007; 
1997; 1992). These rights are being ignored by 
the use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to 
choose the best genes and for the selection of 
embryos that are compatible with the couple’s 
diseased children. These situations show the 
instrumentalization of human life and yet, they 
are authorized by resolution 2.168/2017 of the 
Brazilian Federal Council of Medicine.
1. THE IDENTITY 
BETWEEN “HUMAN 
BEING” AND “PERSON”: 
ROBERT SPAEMANN’S 
CONCEPT OF PERSONA
The extracorporeal embryo created by in vitro 
fertilization brings with itself the concept of 
person, including its meaning and attributes, 
since rights and duties can only be assigned 
to a subject under law. The word “person”, 
undoubtedly, presents a multifaceted concept 
that was culturally constructed and, therefore, 
for the law, this word does not carry all of its 
semantics. The term was redefined in order to 
facilitate its operationalization and, therefore, 
“person” became a technical-legal concept of law.
However, the inclusion of the human person 
in the formal and abstract concept of subject 
within legal relations puts the latter on the same 
level of legal entities, which, due to technical-
scientific reasons, are also qualified as subjects 
of legal relations. In a system grounded in the 
formal structure of the legal relation, people are 
considered subjects, not because their human 
nature and dignity are recognized, but rather 
because the law provides them faculties or 
obligations to act on, delimiting their exercise 
of power or demanding the fulfillment of duties.
In this technical-legal sense, the notion of “per-
son” does not coincide with the notion of human 
being, which results in a disrepute of the human 
person, since it is reduced to a mere element of 
the legal relation.
In the Constitution, the human person is not 
categorized as a subject that can appoint, that 
formally constitutes a family and that owns a 
property. The constitutional protection is directed 
at the person’s dignity, which is considered in 
all of its derivations. All of the institutions that 
exist in the legal order find a guarantee only 
due to their function to allow the development 
of human personality (promotional function). In 
the new constitutional order, the human person 
centralizes the legal institutions to the extent 
that the individual is valued. Therefore, the 
technical-legal concept of person is insufficient 
to suffice for most of the varied situations in 
which the person, like all human beings, must 
be protected.
The history of mankind is filled with examples of 
the transformation of human beings into objects 
for the use by other people. Colonialism, slavery, 
racism and Nazism, as modes of discrimination, 
have all made evident the vulnerability of the 
human condition. Today, in the context of techno-
logical innovations, we question whether there is 
a new type of discrimination, a subtler one that 
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only considers as a “person” the human being 
with a certain degree of physical, psychological 
and social development (Palazzani, 2007).
According to Robert Spaemann’s account (2010), 
which is the theoretical reference adopted for this 
study, the concept of “person” cannot be defined 
from the ascertainment of determined specific 
qualities. The choice for certain characteristics 
for the definition of a person will always be 
arbitrary and will imply accepting that some 
have authority and power to decide in which 
conditions one is or ceases to be a person.
Spaemann (2010) averts the understanding that 
differentiates “human being” from “person” and 
avoids the considerations that define as “person” 
only those that in fact unite rationality and 
self-conscience, which therefore exclude from 
this concept all embryos, fetuses, elderly people 
who begin to lose the use of reason, individuals 
in a comma and others who do not hold the 
previously mentioned qualities. For Spaemann 
(2010), cognitive function does not define a 
person; there is no necessary link between both 
categories. The person should not be confused 
with her qualities; because then she would stop 
being a person when she no longer possessed 
these qualities. It is because men are treated like 
people that the development of these abilities 
is possible.1 The person can only see herself 
as an autonomous and imputable agent if the 
continuity of herself or her natural development 
is uninterrupted.
Being a person is also not a status because 
one does not appear little by little. Therefore, 
1 Spaemann (2010) exemplifies such argumentation with the moth-
er-child relationship. He explains that humans are not rational 
and self-conscious until their mothers talk to them. By talking, a 
mother treats her child as a person from the beginning. She talks 
as if her child understands it and, from then on, the child in fact 
begins understanding. It is observed that only after the being is 
treated as a person he or she can develop the qualities for which 
their personality is recognized.
personality is not qualitative; it does not allow 
gradation and, therefore, there is not a point 
that distinguishes whether the being is or is not 
a person. Since there is no transition between 
“something” and “someone,” the embryo cannot 
be taken as a potential person, but only as a 
person in a determined stage of her development.
In the essence of every conscious living being, 
there is, before anything else, a group of potential 
positions for the being; thus, in what concerns the 
human species, the decision-making experiences 
depend on a determined degree of intensity. 
Becoming aware is a quality of experience itself. 
Experience becomes conscious of itself in its own, 
singular experience (Spaemann, 2010). In this 
sense, Spaemann (2010) defends that conscious 
life is not at first conscious of itself as conscience, 
but as life; that is, conscience starts as an impulse 
from which one lives before being conscious to, 
afterwards, become aware of oneself.
Conscience exists in a metaphysical dimension 
and its development, even if it is still only 
prospective, is inherent to the human essence, 
but conscientious acts are performed in different 
degrees. If conscience, as understood by Husserl 
(2006), is the element that characterizes both 
man and person, any man is a person, even if 
there is no actual rationality. Therefore, there are 
no extrinsic requisites to be fulfilled by man 
to deserve the qualification of person; one only 
needs to be human.
Consequently, since the embryo gathers all 
necessary characteristics for the development of the 
born human, and, as such, continually transforms 
itself until death, due to the multiplication and 
mutation of his or her cells, there is no valid 
reason to exclude it from the category of person. 
This, in turn, makes it worthy of recognition 
and legal protection (Andorno, 2012; Palazzani, 
2007; 1997; 1992).
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Spaemann (2010) defends a substantialism 
about the being. Personality has its starting 
point in an ontological conception, but does 
not reduce itself to an ontological loneliness; 
it first develops other spheres, such as family, 
society and culture, which, throughout human 
development, will be equally important for the 
formation of the person and his or her identity. 
The relation of the individual with its peers is a 
constitutive part of its existence. Intersubjective 
relationships allow the individual to be aware of 
itself and, in this sense, the term “person” refers 
to a dialogue, since it is only possible to know 
oneself through the other. The term “person”, even 
though it primarily refers to a coincidence with 
the biological essence of the human being, needs 
to be understood from a relational perspective, 
with an intrinsic bipolarity, in which one only 
is a person next to someone else.
Man only knows himself and is capable of 
defining himself in a relationship. The answer 
to the question “who is man?” will always be 
revelation of a group of relationships that 
define him. The development of personality, 
achieving human potential or, in other words, 
the implementation of all that man can be 
and is asked to be, happen in relationships 
with others (Gonçalves, 2008). Intersubjective 
relationships, however, are not juxtaposed on 
the personal reality; they are constitutive of 
the very ontological reality of the person in the 
relation. This relational opening does not mean 
that man is a being in itself. Being in itself and 
being with are a dichotomy only in appearance. 
The two dimensions lay entirely within the 
person’s structure. “Person” is a unique, although 
complex, reality. The complexity of these two 
existential dimensions integrates the unit of the 
person’s ontological reality.
Therefore, man is not just a relational opening, a 
perspective that would negate any true subsistent 
ontic dimension. The contrary is also true, 
since man is not exhausted by an ontological 
enclosure, intersubjectivity would seem like 
something accidental and dispensable. Man 
is constituted by both dimensions in one and 
only act of being. This reality is what we call 
“person” (Gonçalves, 2008, p.158). Human reality 
is ontologically immutable. This truth brings an 
inevitable consequence to Law: the inherent legal 
implications in relation to being a person are the 
same, not depending on the circumstances or the 
subject’s condition. Since there are not any diverse 
ontological moments in the human reality, the 
only possible description for the extracorporeal 
human embryo is the recognition of its status 
as a person.
2. THE DEFICIT OF 
ETHICAL REFLECTION 
AND DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY OF 
RESOLUTION 2168/17 
OF THE BRAZILIAN 
FEDERAL COUNCIL OF 
MEDICINE
With regard to reproductive technologies, there 
is a gap between the ethical formulation and the 
legal standardization. Brazilian Law did not con-
sider assisted reproduction as a field that needs 
to be effectively regulated. In Brazil, regulation 
of this matter has been conducted by the Federal 
Council of Medicine. Since the Federal Council 
of Medicine is the body that defines the precepts 
of medical ethics, this is, the rules of conduct 
for practicing medicine, it does not have social 
legitimacy to make dispositions about matters 
that affect the whole society.
We observe in the Council’s resolutions that deal 
with reproductive techniques the stipulation of 
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duties and rights for the service users, so that 
the rules of professional conduct for doctors have 
become moral judging parameters for conflict 
cases. Diniz (2000) explains that the moral 
prestige reached by the Council strengthened the 
belief that the task of mediating moral conflicts 
in medicine exclusively concerns the Council and 
this is never questioned, particularly by medical 
service users or even by other health professions. 
There is an understanding that the doctor’s profes-
sional ethic must also be the standard for moral 
conduct by all those involved in health services, 
an assumption that reinforces the authority of 
doctors in the national sanitary structure.
However, we also observe the existence of an 
exclusively scientistic bias present in the bills 
in progress2 that end up favoring particularly 
the interest of professionals involved in the field 
(clinics and pharmaceutical laboratories), and 
silencing the dissonant voices in the matter. 
Thus, completely neglecting some fundamental 
rights of the new life form that is being generated. 
Life producing technologies can be understood 
as being inserted in a logic of biotechnologi-
cal consumption and commodification of the 
production of life, given their concentration in 
the private medicine sector, which equates the 
conception of a child to the consumption of 
luxury goods. We verify, then, a change in con-
temporary capitalism that includes experiences 
and relationships as goods.
The capital, science and technology triple alliance is 
visible in the figure of the techno-embryo (Ramírez-
Gálvez, 2003): its constitution was only made possible 
2 Bill 3638 (Brazil, 1993), the oldest one, was archived in 2002. Bill 
2855 (Brazil, 1997) was appended to Bill 4665 (Brazil, 2001) in 
2001. Since April 2003, the project was in the Constitution, Justice 
and Editing Committee of the House of Representatives. On July 
2nd of 2003, this project was appended to Bill 1184 (Brazil, 2003). 
There is also Senate Bill 90/99 (Brazil, 1999) that was archived 
in 2007. All the projects mentioned, even though they present 
divergences in some parts, they have the objective to institute 
norms for the use of assisted reproduction techniques.
by the high financial investments in the scientific 
and technological areas. The creation of partnerships 
between specialized clinics and pharmaceutical 
laboratories brings with it the question about the place 
of laboratories in the configuration and expansion 
of the therapeutic spectrum of medications and the 
use of medical equipment.
Marketing interest follows the expansion of 
new conceptive technologies in order to make 
the commodification of the body and its parts 
something acceptable. The convergence of capital, 
science and technology submits the domains 
of social life to the regulation of market laws. 
Strathern (1992) argues that services of assisted 
reproduction are not applied in favor of the self. 
Following a strategy of consumption, the entire 
enterprise primarily satisfies those who try to 
make a business out of the family.
Given the importance of legal assets at stake, 
such as human dignity, life, reproductive rights 
and scientific progress, the lack of a more 
precise legal regulation of the techniques for 
assisted reproduction causes perplexity. The 
lack of laws opens questions about medical 
knowledge, excluding the influence of other types 
of knowledge such as psychology, anthropology, 
philosophy and even jurisprudence. Currently, 
there is no incentive for a democratic debate 
and this entire matter is only regulated by 
resolutions that are provided by the Federal 
Council of Medicine.
Nonetheless, we admit that even if the procla-
mation of a specific law to regulate this issue is 
made, it will be insufficient after a while, since 
it is impossible to foresee all eventual conflicts. 
Despite this, the commitment to a legislative 
process on this issue is indispensable in order 
for the discussion about reproductive technologies 
to involve various sectors of the society, so as to 
make it an ample exercise of democratic debate. 
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There is a need for establishing channels for 
discussion among society and the Government, 
such as public audiences, in order to allow the 
creation of a legal discipline for assisted repro-
duction that actually includes the values of the 
political society.
Resolution 2.168/17 of the Federal Council of 
Medicine is recent and lacks proper interpretation. 
It allows the use of techniques of assisted repro-
duction to categorize the embryo’s HLA system, in 
order to select embryos that are HLA-compatible 
to another child of the couple that might be al-
ready affected by an illness that can be effectively 
treated by transplanting stem cells or organs. The 
resolution also allows for the use of reproductive 
technologies for homosexual couples or single 
people; for assisted reproduction post-mortem, as 
long as there is a specific previous authorization 
from the deceased parent; and for the shared 
donation of oocytes. These are all themes that 
have not been debated democratically.
In the absence of a scientific study that searches 
for a better interpretation of the new reproductive 
technologies, there is a risk that the scientistic 
bias affects the pending bills in the country for 
the defense of the interest of professionals and 
neglect of the users and the society. Just because 
a technology is available, it does not legitimate all 
of its forms of use; they must first be evaluated 
based on the values of the political community. 3
3 In the technocratic model, the State is just the executor of decisions 
that are taken technically, not considering the judgment of values 
that refer to the interests of an organized society. Technique is 
autonomous and is seen as the only optimal, efficient way. The 
ideology that the technique is more efficient because it does not 
carry judgment of values is predominant. It is not possible to agree 
with this statement, since the technique hides the interests of those 
that dominate the technical means. In this context, the values and 
principles that are constitutionally ensured no longer hinder the 
techniques. Fundamental rights lose function when they can no 
longer hinder technical advances.
3. ETHICAL DILEMMAS OF 
THE PRE-IMPLANTATION 
GENETIC DIAGNOSIS
The previous critiques are visible in the 
authorization for the use of the techniques of 
assisted reproduction coupled to the selection 
of embryos subjected to diagnosis of genetic 
alterations that cause disease, according to 
Resolution 2.168/17 of the Brazilian Federal 
Council of Medicine.
The Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) 
is done to detect chromosomal and genetic 
pathologies in order to rule out specific genetic 
conditions or to select the best embryos to be 
transferred to the uterus, excluding the possi-
bility of the development of a future hereditary 
genetic disease. The technique is applied, mostly, 
on couples with a high reproductive risk.
Prior genetic knowledge allows, thus, correc-
tive measures that take place in two different 
manners. It is possible to identify the genotype 
of the embryos (that will be implanted) and 
impede the expression of enzymes or proteins 
that generate from an unwanted gene through the 
use of personalized treatments, thus preventing 
certain diseases with a genetic predisposition. 
Likewise, the genotype of many embryos can be 
studied previously and only those that present 
the desired characteristics are chosen, whereas 
the remaining ones get frozen.
As is clear, from this technique, some people 
start having the power to define genes and, 
consequently, embryos, which must be either 
conserved or eliminated; through the anticipated 
manipulation of the processes of the biological life, 
these people have control over future generations. 
Moral and political implications emerge thereof, 
regarding the need to examine whether this 
technization of the human life alters the ethical 
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perception of the species, and the way in which 
man sees himself as free and morally equal, 
responsible for his own story.
In light of Habermasian thought, the choice for 
the best genes has an impact on the autonomy 
of the individual to be generated and in the 
moral structure of the society. The irreversible 
decision over someone else’s genetic heritage 
raises an unknown intersubjective relationship, 
different from other relationships of recogni-
tion, given that it excludes the symmetry of the 
responsibility (Habermas, 2004). Without this 
symmetry, one can no longer consider that all 
subjects have a chance to make an experiment 
out of themselves, with their own achievements 
and capacities, since those, whose genes were 
previously selected, are deprived of this possi-
bility to constitute themselves through an ethics 
of self-reflection.
From the moment that parents choose the ge-
netic configuration of their children, they imply 
certain expectations that they hope to see come 
true. This can harm the being’s conscience of 
autonomy, and will have more difficulties to 
see him or herself as an autonomous member 
of a community of free and equal individuals, 
born under the same conditions. The ethical 
self-comprehension is dependent on the fact 
that we see ourselves as the sole directors of our 
life story and we can recognize ourselves and 
mutually as people that behave autonomously 
(Habermas, 2004).
The choice of the genetic material cannot be 
seen as an extension of the parents’ reproductive 
freedom; it is not part of this fundamental right 
and it is in conflict with the ethical freedom 
of the children. Habermas (2004) defends the 
existence of the right to non-manipulated genetic 
inheritance. For this philosopher, the conservation 
of a biological heritage free of genetic manipulation 
presents itself as the only way to secure equality 
and freedom in interpersonal relationships. By 
differentiating positive and negative eugenics,4 
Habermas (2004) accepts the occurrence of the 
latter, since the search for the prevention of genetic 
diseases somehow considers the consent (even if 
it is counter-factical) of that being. The need for 
consensus allows for the specialist’s performance 
to be consistent with the communicative action 
when considering the perspective of the other.
On the other hand, by practicing positive eugenics, 
the adopted perspective refers to the parents’ 
subjective preference, while the specialist takes 
on the role of an artisan who will mold the 
genetic composition of the cells to meet the 
parents’ wish to conceive a being that carries 
in its genetic heritage the best genes according 
to their judgment of value.
We observe that the two types of eugenics are 
different based on the attitude they have towards 
the embryo. In negative eugenics, there is a com-
municative approach, while in positive eugenics, 
there is an instrumental approach. The genetic 
project that the parents determine for their fu-
ture children does not meet the conditions of 
reciprocity for communicative comprehension. 
The parents’ preferences dictate the genetic in-
terventions, reducing the embryo to a state of 
availability by the technique (Habermas, 2004).
Genetic interventions for the selection of the 
best genes do not permit dialogue and do not 
treat the planned child as a second person (Ha-
bermas, 2004):
4 Habermas (2004, p.107) defends a gradual protection of life. The 
philosopher does not consider the embryo as a being that should 
be considered a person and, therefore, by approaching the hori-
zontal effect of fundamental rights, he explains that, in the case 
of a eugenic practice, such effect has an indirect nature. For the 
author, eugenics does not hurt the rights of an existing person, 
but, in certain circumstances, it reduces the status of a future 
person. This argument is rejected in this paper, which adopts as 
a theoretical reference the concept of person developed by Robert 
Spaemann and, therefore, considers the embryo as a person. 
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The genetic program is a mute reality and, 
in a sense, it cannot be repaired, for the 
one who is not satisfied with his geneti-
cally fixed intentions cannot, like those 
born naturally, relate to his own aptitudes 
(and deficiencies) throughout the story of 
a life whose appropriation was reflected 
and whose continuation was voluntary, 
so as to review his self-comprehension 
and find a productive answer to his initial 
situation. (pp. 86-87)
Eugenic interventions of improvement hurt the 
ethical freedom of the being generated, since 
it is subjugated to purposes defined by others, 
which it might come to reject someday, but to 
which it will be stuck irreversibly. Therefore, its 
comprehension of being the sole author of its 
own story will be undoubtedly compromised.
These considerations apply to the matter of 
medication-babies considering that PGD is, in fact, 
a modality of control over the embryos’ genetic 
quality. Undesired genes are eliminated as much 
as embryos that carry illnesses. Resolution 20175, 
by allowing the use of assisted reproduction 
techniques to select embryos that are HLA-
compatible to another child of the couple who 
is already affected by a disease, have authorized 
the “production” of embryos whose biological 
material will be destined to treat someone else.
Embryos are already created having a specific 
function, which is incompatible with human 
dignity in the Kantian formulation, which 
conceives a human being as an end for itself. 
To be generated with reservations and, only after 
a genetic examination, to be considered worthy 
of existing and developing is not compatible to 
the principle of human dignity. Furthermore, if 
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techniques of assisted reproduction can also be used to type the 
embryo’s HLA system in order to selected those who are HLA-com-
patible to another child of the couple that is already affected by 
an illness; an illness that presents an effective treatment in the 
transplantation of stem cells or organs.
PGD analyzes two cells of an embryo that only 
has eight, it increases the probability of this 
being, if born, to suffer serious illnesses linked 
to genetic imprinting, a risk that is not divulged 
by fertilization clinics.
Another ethically negative aspect of the produc-
tion of medication-babies is that this implies 
the freezing or destruction of a great number 
of embryos. Chao (2010) reports that, in 2005, 
the updated results of the experiments of the 
Chicago Reproductive Genetics Institute, along 
with other centers in Australia, Belgium and 
Turkey, show that out of the 1130 embryos pro-
duced, only 123 were compatible and therefore 
implanted; of these, only 13 were born, which 
reveals an efficiency of 1.15% in the method. 
The same author asserts that PGD is presented 
to the society as an effective way to eliminate 
illnesses. However, PGD does not prevent ill-
nesses, it eliminates its carrier.
Therefore, we argue that PGD is a technique that 
provides some human beings the capacity to 
decide over the lives of others. The parents and 
doctors see themselves as having the authority 
to decide whether the genome of the individuals 
generated have the necessary quality before they 
can develop. The rights to health and life of the 
embryo generated in vitro are not being considered 
in order to solve the problem at hand.
4. CONCLUSION
Technological advances have adopted a role of 
“villain” in society, which represents to most the 
danger of a new Leviathan. Technology, however, 
should not be a problem, but its presence must be 
built from dialogue and intersubjectivity, so that 
the technique does not present a loss in identity.
Technical-scientific progress must not be con-
demned as if it was intrinsically perverse. It is 
undeniable that progress provides goods and 
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services thanks to which it is possible to enjoy 
a better quality of life and, in the case of tech-
nologies for assisted reproduction, the technique 
allows for the accomplishment of the parents’ 
reproductive right.
The central point in this matter is in the distinc-
tion that must be made between real progress 
and apparent progress, where only the one that 
uses such techniques for the development of 
human personality should be considered.
In relation to assisted reproduction, we verified 
that the regulation by the Brazilian Law is at the 
mercy of the technique, since no ethical reflection 
has yet been made. Resolution 2168/17 of the 
Brazilian Federal Council of Medicine authorizes 
the use of PGD without major considerations, 
ignoring the effects that the previous analysis of 
genes will cause to the future generations and 
to the perception of the human species itself. 
Therefore, we found that an instrumentalization 
of human life in its initial phase is sufficient 
to sustain the unconstitutionality of all the 
biotechnological practices that reify the human 
being and put it at the service of other purposes 
other than to itself.
The extracorporeal embryo, in the current Brazilian 
scenario, is seen according to the technical-scientific 
categories and is reduced to the status of a “thing.” 
This new objectification is much more direct, 
since it presides directly on the human being’s 
body. The person’s job is no longer threatened by 
objectification, but rather the person’s own being 
is threatened in its deepest radicalization.
Scientific progress does not result in moral 
progress; therefore, we argue the need for the 
holding of a democratic procedure that includes 
other information that is currently excluded by 
the scientistic bias of the normative documents 
that deal with assisted reproduction.
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